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Gender Equality: Constitutional Challenges and Competing Discourses  
Ratna Kapur 
 In this essay I address the issue of equality in the context of postcolonial India and some of the 
structural and normative obstacles encountered by women when bringing constitutional challenges in the bid 
for greater equality. These challenges cannot be measured in terms of whether women in the postcolonial 
world are better off or worse off. Such evaluative judgments tend to reinforce an “us and them” binary, where 
the situation of women in the west are regarded as the civilizational and cultural standard to be achieved. Such 
a position obscures the ways in which the history of the colonial encounter has partly produced this binary that 
continues to inform the contemporary responses to gender in the postcolonial world, as well as the ways in 
which global economic structures and neo-liberal models are implicated in producing and reinforcing some of 
the gender stereotypes that we are witnessing in the workplace both here and there. 
 I examine efforts at using law, and particularly, constitutional equality rights to challenge laws that 
discriminate on the basis of sex in India.  I examine some of the efforts to use fundamental rights to equality as 
guaranteed by Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution to challenge legal rules and provisions that are alleged 
to discriminate against women. The effort is to reveal the extent to which judicial approaches to equality, sex 
discrimination, and gender difference have limited the role that constitutional rights have played in the 
promotion of women's substantive equality.   
 In the first part of this paper, I review the competing approaches to equality, and to gender difference.  
I argue that the judicial approach has been overwhelmingly influenced by a formal approach to equality, and a 
protectionist approach to gender difference. The formal approach, in which equality is equated with sameness, 
and the protectionist approach to gender difference, in which women are understood as weak and in need of 
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protection have operated to limit the efficacy of these constitutional challenges. 
 In the second part of this paper I draw attention to how familial ideology has informed the judiciary's 
approach to gender difference, and the ways in which the governing norms that privilege women’s familial 
roles have operated to limit the attempts to use constitutional equality rights to challenge laws that discriminate 
against women. In particular, I argue that the discourses through which women are seen as mothers and wives 
with particular social roles and responsibilities are important in constituting women as "different."  Treating 
women differently in law is not seen as discrimination but as protecting and promoting women's natural roles 
in the family.  
 I provide a few examples to illustrate how fundamental rights challenges have often operated to 
reinscribe the very familial and legal discourses that have constituted women as different, and as subordinate, 
looking at the issues of domestic violence, maintenance, sexual expression and sexual harassment. The 
analysis is not intended as a comprehensive review of gender equality in Indian constitutional law, but 
illustrative of the normative and structural constraints that are encountered in legal discourse when addressing 
gender equality.  
 My focus is to examine how equality discourses have operated with dominant familial discourses at 
times to preclude effective constitutional challenges on the basis of sex discrimination (Kapur and Cossman, 
1996; Agnes, 2000; Jaisingh, 2000).  It is not the only factor nor even the most important factor in these 
decisions, but simply that it is a factor that needs to be taken into account.   In other words, in evaluating the 
potential for equality rights strategies to challenge rules, regulations, and practices that discriminate against 
women, familial ideology needs to be considered.  
I. Formal versus Substantive Equality 
 Equality rights are formally guaranteed in Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Indian Constitution.1  But the 
                     
1 Article 14 Equality before law The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection 
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Constitution tells us very little about the specific content of equality rights.  The general principle of equality 
and non-discrimination is nowhere defined in the Constitution. I briefly discuss two different approaches to 
equality through which the constitutional guarantees can be understood: a formal approach to equality, and a 
substantive approach to equality (Williams, 2013, 56-60).  While the formal approach to equality has been 
dominant within Indian constitutional law, fragments of the substantive approach have from time to time been 
identifiable. I discuss this briefly and will then examine the question of the relevance of gender difference 
within these models of equality. 
 In the formal approach, equality is seen to require equal treatment - all those who are the same must 
be treated the same. It is based on treating likes alike.  The constitutional expression of this approach to 
equality in American and subsequently Indian equal protection doctrine is in terms of the similarly situated 
test - that is - the requirement that “those [who are] similarly situated be treated similarly" (Tussman and 
TenBroek, 1948). Only individuals who are the same are entitled to be treated equally – that is - "[a]ll persons 
                                                                  
of the laws within the territory of India. 
Article 15 prohibits  discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth(15(1)). However, Article 
15(3) provides that  “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and 
children.” See http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%202Pg.Rom8Fsss(6).pdf 
Article 16  provides for equality of opportunity in matters of public employment(16(1)). However, Article 16(3) 
provides that “Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or 
classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a 
State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such employment 
or appointment.(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of 
appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately 
represented in the services under the State. See http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-
english/Const.Pock%202Pg.Rom8Fsss(6).pdf .  
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are to be treated alike, except where circumstances require different treatment" (Reddy, 1982, 58; Singh, 
1976).  If the individuals or groups in question are seen as different, then no further analysis is required even if 
the differences among them are the product of historic or systemic discrimination; difference justifies the 
differential treatment. As Dwivedi (1990, 11) states, “among equals law should be equal and equally 
administered".  This initial definitional step can preclude any further equality analysis.  If the individuals or 
groups in question are seen as different, then no further analysis is required; difference justifies the differential 
treatment. As Brodsky and Day (1990, 158) have argued in the context of equality under the Canadian 
Charter, “The way the court defines a class, or its willingness to recognize a class, can make the difference 
between winning and losing. The Court can justify making a comparison between classes or refusing to make a 
comparison by the way they define the class, or whether they recognize it at all”. (See also Majury, 2002).    
Accordingly, when groups are not similarly situated, then they do not qualify for equality even if the 
differences among them are the product of historic or systemic discrimination. In exploring the problematic 
connection between equality and sameness, Minow (1985, 207) has observed: "The problem with this concept 
of equality is that it makes the recognition of difference a threat to the premise behind equality. If to be equal 
you must be the same, then to be different is to be unequal”.. 
 In contrast, the focus of a substantive equality approach is not simply with the equal treatment of the 
law, but rather with the actual impact of the law.  "Such inequality results from provisions which though 
seemingly neutral in their application (and therefore conforming to notions of formal equality) in reality result 
in discrimination.  Certain provisions have the effect of discriminating between men and women because in 
practice they only affect women" (Maloney, 1988, 301). It seeks to eliminate substantive inequality of 
disadvantaged groups in society. The objective of substantive equality is the elimination of the substantive 
inequality of disadvantaged groups in society (Singh 1976).  Parmanand Singh describes this approach as one 
of equality in fact or compensatory discrimination. The focus of the analysis is not with sameness or 
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difference, but rather with disadvantage.  The central inquiry of this approach is whether the rule or practice in 
question contributes to the subordination of the disadvantaged group. Within this approach, discrimination 
consists of treatment that disadvantages or further oppresses a group that has historically experienced 
institutional and systemic oppression. 
 The shift in focus from sameness and difference to disadvantage significantly broadens equality 
analysis.  For example, within a formal equality model, the difference between persons with physical 
disabilities and persons without disabilities could preclude an equality challenge. Because disabled persons are 
different, they do not have to be treated equally.  Within a substantive equality model, however, the focus is 
not on whether disabled persons are different, but rather, on whether their treatment in law contributes to 
their historic and systemic disadvantage.  Differences do not preclude an entitlement to equality, but rather, 
are embraced within the concept of equality.  Within this model of equality, differential treatment may be 
required "not to perpetuate the existing inequalities, but to achieve and maintain a real state of effective 
equality" (Gupta, 1969, 76).  Thus, the failure of a rule or practice to take into account the particular needs of 
disabled persons, and thus perpetuate the historic disadvantage this group, would constitute discrimination, 
and violate their equality rights. 
  
II Formal Equality in Indian Constitutional Law 
 Indian constitutional law has been overwhelmingly informed by a formal approach to equality.   
Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection under the law.  The Supreme Court of 
India has held that the equality guarantees do not require that the law treat all individuals the same, but rather, 
that any classifications made between individuals be reasonable.  According to the Supreme Court, the 
classification must meet two conditions in order to be found reasonable. 
 
 (i)...the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes 
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group (ii)...that 
differentia must have a rational relating to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in 
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question. (Budhan Choudhry v State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191, Judgement on 
Constitutional Validity, 2 December 1954 (India)) 
 
According to the doctrine of reasonable classification, only those individuals who are similarly situated must be 
treated the same in law (R.K. Dalmia v Justice S.R. Tendolkar, Judgment on Constitutional Validity, AIR 1958 
SC 538, 28 March 1958 (India)).2  Within this doctrine, equality does not require that all individuals are 
treated the same, but only those individuals who are the same.  Equality is thus equated with sameness - and 
sameness is the prerequisite for equality.   
 This formal approach to equality spills over into the judicial approaches to Articles 15 and 16 of the 
Constitution and the particular doctrinal tests that have been developed in relation to these rights to non-
discrimination.  Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, and place of 
birth.  Article 15(3) allows the State to make special provisions for women.  Article 15(3) has largely been 
interpreted as an exception to the principle of non-discrimination guaranteed by Article 15(1) or what has 
been described as “positive discrimination” (Reddy, 2000, 2). Special treatment is an exception to equality, 
rather than as a necessary dimension of it. In contrast, in the substantive equality approach, Article 15(3) has 
been interpreted as part of the equality provisions as a whole, so that the differential treatment authorized 
by this article is not an exception to, but a part of, equality. This approach was endorsed in Motiram More 
Dattatraya v State of Bombay, (Judgement on Constitutional Validity, AIR 1953 Bom 311, p. 314, 18 
November, 1952 (India)), wherein the Bombay High Court stated 
                     
2. The Supreme Court has also emphasized another dimension of Article 14 as a guarantee against arbitrariness. See Ajay 
Hasia v Khalid Mujib, Judgement on Constitutional Validity, AIR 1981 SC 487, p.499, 13 November 1980 (India) and 
E.P.Royapappa v State of Tamil Nadu, Judgement on Constitutional Validity, AIR 1974 SC 555, p. 583, 23 November, 
1973 (India).  See also Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, Judgement on Constitutional Validity ,AIR 1978 SC 597, p. 
624, 25 January 1978 (India).  While many commentators have argued that this doctrine constitutes a significant shift in 
judicial approach to Article 14, the underlying understanding of equality has not been significantly altered, in so far as this 
approach has incorporated the doctrine of classification.    
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The proper way to construe Article 15(3) in our opinion is that whereas under Article 15(1) 
discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 
15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in 
favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1).3 
 This second approach goes some distance towards a substantive model of equality, in so far as difference and 
special treatment do not preclude equality, but rather are embraced within it.   
     This modest shift towards substantial equality in the Dattatraya case is limited however, by the extent 
to which the principle of non-discrimination remains overwhelming influenced by formal equality.  
Discrimination has primarily been interpreted as any classification or distinction on the grounds prohibited by 
Article 15(1).  Again, we can see the extent to which the approach is based on a formal model of equality, in 
which any distinction or differential treatment is seen as a violation of equality.  Article 15(3) is thereby 
interpreted as authorizing the state to discriminate in favour of women. In Dattatraya, for example, the Court 
states: "The proper way to construe Article 15(3)...is that...discrimination in favour of women is permissible, 
and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1)." In contrast, 
a substantive approach to equality would interpret discrimination in terms of whether the treatment of a 
particular group of persons contributed to their historic and systemic subordination, or to overcoming this 
subordination.  Again, the emphasis of substantive equality is not on sameness or difference, but on 
disadvantage.   
 Some inroads have been made towards a substantive model of equality, most notably in relation to 
the equality of opportunity guarantees in relation to employment and the provision for reservations 
contained in Article 16 (Sankaran, 2007). In State of Kerala v N.M. Thomas (Judgement on Constitutional 
Validity, AIR 1976 SC 490, 19 September 1975 (India)), the Supreme Court addressed the question of the 
                     
3. See also Ram Chandra Mahton v State of Bihar, Judgement on Constitutional Validity, AIR 1966 Pat 214, 12 October, 1965 (India)   
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appropriate relationship between Articles 16(1) and 16(4). The Court held that Article 16(4) was not an 
exception to Article 16(1), and held that Articles 15 and 16 must be seen as facets of Article 14.  Further, in 
Thomas, the Supreme Court began to articulate a substantive model of equality (Gallanter, 1982). The 
clearest statement of this doctrinal shift is found in the judgment of Mathew, J. , who noted that the formal 
approach to equality requires criteria by which differences, and thus differential treatment, can be justified. He 
observed that "[t]he real difficulty arises in finding out what constitutes a relevant difference." (Ibid.) Mathew J. 
goes on to state, “Though complete identity of equality of opportunity is impossible in this world, measures 
compensatory in character and which are calculated to mitigate surmountable obstacles to ensure equality of 
opportunity can never incur the wrath of Article 16(1) (Thomas, para. 82).  
 In Indra Sawhey v Union of India (Judgement on Constitutional Validity, AIR 1993 SC 477, 16 
November 1992 (India)), the Supreme Court again emphasized that equality of opportunity may require 
treating persons differently in order to treat them equally.  Although the continued use of the language of 
formal equality - of the similarly situated test, and of classification - in some ways limits the development in the 
majority decision, the minority decision of Sawant J went considerably further in articulating a more 
substantive vision of equality.  According to Sawant J., equality "is a positive right, and the State is under an 
obligation to undertake measures to make it real and effectual:...To enable all to compete with each other on 
an equal plane, it is necessary to take positive measures to equip the disadvantaged and the handicapped to 
bring them to the level of the fortunate advantaged " (Indra Sawhney, paras 396, 397). 4 
                     
4 See also Subhash Chandra v Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, Judgement on Constitutional Validity (2009) 
15 SCC 458, p.493, para 79,, 4 August 2009 (India), where the Court has stated that, “The law relating to affirmative 
action and protective discrimination … invoking clause (4) of Article   16 of the Constitution of India is reflected by 
constitutionalism…). Similarly in Union of India v Rakesh Kumar, Judgement on Constitutional Validity, (2010) 4 SCC 
50,, p 72, para 87, 12 January 2010 (India), the Supreme Court has reiterated that “It is a well-accepted premise in our 
legal system that ideas such as “substantive equality” and “distributive justice” are at the heart of our understanding of the 
guarantee of “equal protection before the law”. The State can treat unequals differently with the objective of creating 
a level-playing field in the social, economic and political spheres”  
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Some courts have recognized the doctrinal shift in Thomas.5 In Roop Chand Adlakha v Delhi 
Development Authority, Judgement on Constitutional Validity, AIR 1989 SC 307, p. 312, 26 September 
1988 (India), the Court was critical of the doctrine of classification within formal equality, observing that the 
process of classification could obscure the question of inequality. The Supreme Court held that "…..to justify 
classification cannot rest on merely differentials which may, by themselves by rational or logical, but depends 
on whether the differences are relevant to the goals to be reached by the law which seeks to classify"  
 Similarly, in Marri Chandra Skekhar Rao v Dean, Seth G.S.M. College and Others, Judgement on 
Interpretation, (1990) 3 SCC 130, p.138, 2 May 1990(India), where the Supreme Court recognized that 
disadvantaged persons may have to be treated differently in order to be treated equally. “Those who are 
unequal, in fact, cannot be treated by identical standards; that may be equality in law but it would certainly not 
be real equality...The State must, therefore, resort to compensatory State action for the purpose of making 
people who are formally unequal in their wealth, education or social environment, equal in specified areas”  
 Notwithstanding the important developments in the Supreme Court jurisprudence of equality as 
including compensatory state action for historically and socially disadvantaged groups, formal equality 
continues to dominate much judicial thinking on constitutional equality rights.  As I demonstrate in 
subsequent sections, the courts' approach to equality has been and remains overwhelmingly formal, with its 
focus on sameness and equal treatment. 
 
III. Equality and Gender Difference: 
 The debate over the meaning of equality is further complicated in the context of women, and gender 
                     
5. See Jagdish Rai v State of Haryana, Judgement on Constitutional Validity, AIR 1977 P&H 56, p. 61, 17 September 
1976 (India),  in which Thomas is interpreted as having "introduced a new dynamic and a new dimension into the 
concept of...equality of opportunity " . (See also Singh, 1976, p. 304-319; Galanter, 1989) 
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equality (Kaufman, 2006).  The prevailing conception of equality as sameness has led to a focus on the 
relevance of gender difference.  If women and men are different, then how can they be treated equally?  But if 
they are treated differently, then what becomes of the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sex?  Do 
the constitutional guarantees require that women and men be treated the same?  
 Three very different approaches to the question of gender difference have been developed: 
protectionist, sameness, and compensatory.  In the first approach, women are understood as different from 
men - more specifically, as weaker, subordinate, and in need of protection.  In this approach, any legislation or 
practices that treats women differently than men can be justified on the basis that women and men are 
different, and that women need to be protected.  Any differential treatment of women is virtually deemed to 
be intended to protect and thus benefit women.  This approach tends to essentialise difference - that is to say - 
to take the existence of gender difference as the natural and inevitable.  There is no interrogation of the basis 
of the difference, nor consideration of the impact of the differential treatment on women.  In the name of 
protecting women, this approach often serves to reinforce their subordinate status. 
 The second approach is an equal treatment or sameness approach.   In this approach, women are 
understood as the same as men - that is to say - for the purposes of law - they are the same, and must be 
treated the same.  In this approach, any legislation or practice that treats women differently than men is seen to 
violate the equality guarantees. This sameness approach has been used to strike down provisions that treat 
women and men differently.  It has, however, also been used to preclude any analysis of the potentially 
disparate impact of gender neutral legislation.  According to the sameness approach, it is sufficient that women 
and men be treated formally equally. Any recognition of gender difference in the past has been perceived as a 
tool for justifying discrimination against women. 
 In the third approach, women are understood as a historically disadvantaged group, and as such, in 
need of compensatory or corrective treatment.  Within this approach, gender difference is often seen as 
  
 
 
  11 
relevant, and as requiring recognition in law.  It is argued that a failure to take difference into account will only 
serve to reinforce and perpetuate the difference and the underlying inequalities.  In this approach, rules or 
practices that treat women differently from men can be upheld, if such rules or practices are designed to 
improve the position of women. If, however, the legislation or practice is based on a stereotype or assumption 
that women are different, weaker or in need of protection, it would not be upheld. 
 Proponents of this compensatory approach attempt to illustrate how the ostensibly gender neutral 
rules of the formal equality approach are not gender neutral at all - but rather, based on male standards and 
values. In such a model, women will only qualify for equality to the extent that they can conform to these male 
values and standards. Thus, the compensatory approach argues that gender differences must be taken into 
account in order to produce substantive equality for women. 
 The judicial approach to sex discrimination in India is overwhelmingly influenced by a formal 
approach to equality, and often, a protectionist approach to gender difference that has operated to preclude 
any entitlement to equality. And this problematic approach to gender is often informed by familial ideology, 
and an understanding of women's gender difference in terms of the sexual division of labour within the family.  
At the same time, it is important to recognize that the judicial approaches to equality and gender difference are 
neither homogeneous, nor static but a site of contest, in which the different visions of equality and gender 
difference compete.  
IV Gender Equality in Judicial decisions  
 In this section I discuss specific cases to illustrate how gender equality plays out in judicial discourse.  
a. Domestic Violence 
 The Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act of 2005 (PWDVA), is one of the most 
progressive laws enacted in favour of women’s rights in recent times. But it has also encountered a barrage of 
legal challenges. In 2008 a case was brought before the Delhi high court, to challenge the PWDVA as being 
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ultra vires the Constitution on the grounds that it accords protection only to women and not to men (Aruna 
Parmod Shah v Union of India (2008) 102 DRJ 543 (Delhi, India). The Writ Petition was filed by the mother-
in-law for quashing of the proceedings initiated against her under the PWDVA in a lower court. The Delhi 
High Court upheld the Act stating that: 
 …that the lot and fate of women in India is an abjectly dismal one, which requires bringing into place, 
on an urgent basis, protective and ameliorative measures against exploitation of women (para 4). 
 
The Court held that classifying women as a class in need of protection under this Act was not unconstitutional. 
While cases of men being subjected to domestic violence did occur, these cases were very few in number and 
did not call for the same protection under the Act. 
 The petitioner further challenged the Act on the grounds that it provided equal rights to those couples 
who were married and to those in a live-in relationship, even though the two were not alike. The Court held 
that just like the “abjectly dismal” (para 4) lot of the married woman, women in live-in relationships were in 
need of protection as such relationships were “invariably initiated and perpetuated by the male” (para 5) and 
the “social stigma always sticks to the women and not to the men” (para 5) in such relationships. 
 While the court wdid not strike down this very progressive legislation, we still have to question the 
reasoning on which this holding is based. The case operates within the framework of formal equality- men and 
women are not treated the same way under this Act as they are perceived differently whether in a marriage or 
in a live in relationship. While no stigma attaches to a man who is a part of a relationship in the nature of 
marriage, the woman who enters such a relationship is often stigmatized. The Court constructs the woman as a 
hapless participant in the live in relationship “perpetuated” by a man and thus in need for protection.  
 Familial ideology operates to portray the wife as someone who is dependent and in need of support 
when she is abused. A similar logic is extended into the non-marital relationship, where women are again 
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viewed as entering into such relationships through coercion rather than choice and rendered even more 
vulnerable because of the stigma attached to such relationships, especially if it does not result in marriage. The 
case provides an example of reinforcing gender stereotypes in familial relationships while also protecting the 
legislation, which in contrast is based on rights to bodily integrity and sexual autonomy. It is an important 
example of how we need to take a step back and examine what has been lost when we experience a victory in 
the court room as well as what has been won when we experience a defeat.  
 b.  Maintenance 
 Constitutional challenges have been directed to the maintenance provisions of several family law 
statutes. The Criminal Procedure Code contains provisions that direct a man to provide alimony to a woman 
who is divorced or separated. The provision was challenged as violating Article 15 that prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex. In the case of  Purnananda Banerjee v  Swapna Banerjee and Anr, 
Judgement on Constitutional Validity, AIR 1981 Cal 123, 10 December, 1980 (India), the wife had filed for 
divorce on the grounds of cruelty and also filed an application for alimony pendete lite under Section 36 of 
the Special Marriage Act. The husband opposed the application and challenged the constitutional validity of 
the section., The High Court of Calcutta upheld the maintenance law on the grounds that it did not 
discriminate only on the basis of sex, but rather provided maintenance where the wife had no independent 
income sufficient for her support. (Para 9). The Court further held that even if the provision under challenge 
did discriminate on the basis of sex alone, it would be protected by Article 15(3) that enables the State to make 
special provisions for women. (Para 9) 
  The Court approached the question of the constitutionality of the law from the perspective of formal 
equality.  Article 15 is seen as prohibiting any classification based on sex - or more specifically, any 
classification based "only on the ground of sex."  In order to uphold the section the Court had to find that the 
section did not discriminate only on the ground of sex, but on other grounds as well.  In the Court's view, the 
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classification was based not only on sex, but on a wife's need for economic support where she had no 
independent means of support.  Women's economic dependency within the family is thereby separated from 
sex, for the specific purpose of upholding legislation intended to address this economic dependency. 
 The case is an interesting example of the judicial gymnastics made necessary by the formal model of 
equality.  The technical approach of "only on the ground of sex" is used to uphold legislation that would 
otherwise be seen to violate Article 15, by drawing artificial distinctions between sex, and socially constructed 
gender differences, or in the words of other courts who have been critical of this approach, between "sex and 
what sex implies."  The formal understanding of equality, within which any classification on the basis of sex is 
seen to constitute discrimination, requires that economic dependency be seen as something other than a 
difference based on sex, if the provision is to be upheld. 
 By way of contrast, a substantive model of equality would similarly allow the Court to uphold such 
legislation, without "severing sex from what it implies."  It would direct attention to whether the rule in question 
contributes to the disadvantage of women, and a compensatory approach to gender, would allow a recognition 
that women may need to be treated differently to compensate for past disadvantage.  Within such an 
approach, the maintenance provision could be upheld on the ground that it takes gender difference into 
account to compensate for past disadvantage.  The reality of women's economic dependence, resulting from 
the sexual division of labour within the family, could be seen to require provisions that recognize and 
compensate women for this dependence. In Krishna Murthy v P.S. Umadevi, Judgement on Constitutional 
Validity, AIR 1987 AP 237, 12 June 1986 (India), section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act was challenged as 
violating Article 14, on the basis that a spouse's liability for alimony was vague, particularly as compared to the 
Indian Divorce Act, where a husband's liability for alimony was expressly limited to a maximum of 1/5 of his 
income.  In a brief decision, the High Court rejected the challenge, and held that there was no invidious 
discrimination or undue disability to the wife or the husband. 
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 The case is also illustrative of the often contradictory nature of familial ideology.  The way in which 
the Court casually draws a distinction between sex and women's financial needs rests, at least partially, on the 
naturalization of women's economic dependency within the family.  Economic dependency is not seen as a 
socially constructed gender difference, but simply, as a natural and inevitable consequence of family life for 
many women.  It is, at least in part, the way in which this assumption operates at the level of common sense 
that allows the Court to hold that the maintenance provision is not a classification on the basis of sex only, and 
in turn, to uphold the section from constitutional challenge.  This result, which both draws upon and 
reinforces familial ideology, is at the same time an important victory both for the individual woman in the 
Calcutta case, who was awarded maintenance, and for all women who may otherwise qualify for maintenance 
under the specific legal provision that was challenged.  The case thus illustrates the extent to which familial 
ideology does not necessarily always work against women's immediate interests.  Rather, in effectively blocking 
the equality challenge to a provision intended to address women's socio-economic inequality, familial ideology 
can be seen to have protected these interests. 
 A rather different constitutional challenge was brought to the maintenance provision in the Kerala 
High Court (K. Shanmukhan v G. Sarojini, Judgement on Constitutional Validity,  (1981) Crim. L.J. 830, 20 
November 1980 (India).. The case involved a challenge to a provision that entitles a divorced woman to 
maintenance while a married woman is not entitled to maintenance if she refuses to live with her husband 
without sufficient reason, lives in adultery or lives separately by mutual consent. The marriage of the parties 
was dissolved and a maintenance order granted for the child. None of the parties contested the legality of the 
divorce. The Magistrate however did not grant maintenance to the divorcee-wife as she was living separately by 
mutual consent, and compensation under the Travancore Ezhava Act was promised to her at the time of 
divorce.  The Court adopted the reasonable classification test, and held that the classification was based on 
intelligible differentia.  In the Court's view, divorced women and married women were differently situated.  
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The conditions stipulated in the impugned law could only apply to married women; they were, by their very 
nature inapplicable to divorced women.  Similarly, the Court observed that divorced women were disentitled 
to maintenance in situations that do not apply to married women, such as, when divorced women remarry.  
The Court adopted a formal approach to equality, according to which the difference between married and 
divorced women is seen to defeat the challenge.  But there is no interrogation of whether the legal treatment 
disadvantages married women. 
 The approach to difference is essentialist: in the Court's view, the differences between married 
women and divorced women are seen as natural, as part of the nature of the institution of marriage.  The 
deeper question of why married and divorced women are different remains unexamined.  There is no 
consideration of the extent to which these differences are a product of the legal regulation of marriage -that is - 
married women and divorced women are different because the law treats them differently.  Rather than 
considering the question of economic dependence and economic need, a criteria according to which married 
and divorced women may be similarly situated, the Court justifies the differential entitlement of maintenance 
on the basis of what it considers to be accepted differences.  The case illustrates how virtually any difference, 
including those differences created solely through law can be found to be intelligible criteria, and thereby 
satisfy the reasonable classification test of the formal equality approach. 
 Nor is there any consideration as to why the law has seen fit to treat these women differently.  In 
examining the assumptions that underlie the law, it is important to recognize that the law does not distinguish 
between divorced women and all married women, but rather, only those married women who refuse to live 
with their husbands without sufficient reason, who live in adultery, or who live separately through mutual 
consent.  The categories of married women who are disentitled from maintenance are those who have chosen 
not to live with their husbands.  The question which is nowhere addressed in the decision is why women who 
choose not to live with their husbands should be any less entitled to maintenance than divorced women (many 
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of whom no doubt also choose not to live with their husbands).  The answer lies in the assumptions about 
women's roles and responsibilities in marriage.  The institution of marriage is seen to involve, first and 
foremost, the obligation of the wife to live with her husband.  The status of being married precludes the idea 
that a woman can choose to not live with her husband.  
 These assumptions about the nature of marriage and about women's roles within marriage remain 
uninterrogated.  According to the formal model of equality, the Court is able to simply point to what it 
understands to be significant differences.  The mere existence of these differences precludes any further 
analysis of the source of these differences.  As with so many of the cases involving challenges to family laws, 
women's discursively constituted roles as wives and mothers are accepted as natural, without any further 
consideration of the inequalities that these roles have produced, nor of the unequal social relations that have 
produced these roles.  Again and again, the formal model of equality and familial ideology which constructs 
women as naturally wives and mothers preempt any substantive interrogation of inequality and disadvantage.  
At the same time, within the context of maintenance laws, familial ideology has largely operated to uphold 
these laws from equality rights challenges by men who have sought to escape from their legal obligations to 
support their wives.   
c. Sexual Expression and Sexual Harassment 
Indian Courts have taken a very conservative view of sexual expression and have constructed the 
woman as a helpless passive victim of the male aggressor and in coming to this conclusion about the sexuality 
of women have failed to distinguish between a case of sexual harassment, rape and positive sexual expression. 
While there have been a handful of cases that have acknowledged the sexual agency of women, most of the 
cases have understood the sexual lives of women as the centre of their dignity in society. In the case of A and 
B v State Thr. N.C.T. of Delhi and Anr,  Judgement on Quashing of FIR, 2010 Cri LJ 669, 25 May 2009 
(India),  a criminal case was registered against a married couple for “sitting in an objectionable position near a 
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Metro pillar and were kissing each other” under the obscenity provisions and resulting in a situation where 
“passersby were feeling bad” (para 9 ). The Delhi High Court held that “it is inconceivable how, even if one 
were to take what is stated in the FIR to be true, the expression of love by a young married couple, in the 
manner indicated in the FIR, would attract the offence of obscenity and trigger the coercive process of the law” 
(para 3). It is important to note that this judgment though prima facie looks very progressive, is severely limited 
in scope by the explicit mention of the married couple who are engaging in the expression of love.  
The recognition of sexual agency within a marital context stands in contrast to the way in which 
sexual subjectivity is treated in the context of sexual harassment in the workplace. In 1997 the Supreme 
Court in the case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, Judgement on Enforcement of Fundamental Rights, 
([1997] AIR 3011 (SC),13 August 1997 (India), recognized the problem of sexual harassment at the 
workplace and accepted that the failure to check this amounted to the violation of the equality rights of the 
woman. The petition was filed when a state government employee who worked as a part of the Women 
Development Programme was brutally raped by a group of landlords in a village in Rajasthan. The 
Rajasthan High Court acquitted the rapists, which led to protests and the subsequent\filing of the petition 
by Vishaka, an organization working for women’s rights.  The Supreme Court formulated guidelines to 
address sexual harassment at the workplace and defined sexual harassment as an unwelcome sexual 
conduct which disadvantages a woman in recruitment/promotion or creates a hostile work environment. 
However, in the Indian Courts the second requirement of hostile work environment has gradually been 
diluted and the focus has been on first leg that is sexual conduct.  
In the first case decided after Vishaka, (Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A K Chopra, 
Judgement on Enforcement of Fundamental Rights, AIR 1999 SC 625, 20 January 1999 (India)), the 
complainant sued the chairman of the company who had tried to molest her several times. In this case, the 
definition of what constitutes sexual harassment was expanded in these words: 
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Any action or gesture which, whether directly or by implication, aims at or has the tendency to 
outrage the modesty of a female employee, must fall under the general concept of the definition of 
sexual harassment. (para 25).  
The court held that the woman had been subject to sexual harassment even though it is never specified 
what exactly happened. And the conduct was regarded as unwelcome because in the courts view she was 
unmarried and hence not familiar with or knowledgeable about matters of sex.  Implicit in this holding is 
that the dress and past sexual conduct of the complainant may be used to assess whether the conduct was in 
fact unwelcome. Such an understanding renders only some kind of women worthy of protection under the 
legal regime, possibly excluding the bar dancer, the waitress and the sex worker. 
Additionally, the court read into the definition of sexual harassment conduct the term “outraging 
the modesty” of a woman, a 19th century expression that had been included in the Penal Code drafted by 
the Victorian colonial ruler and continues to be in operation today. In the process, the court emphasized 
the first leg of the definition of sexual harassment that is sexual conduct, while simultaneously diluting the 
second leg of the test formulated by Vishaka which requires that the alleged sexual harassment creates a 
hostile work environment or prejudices the woman either in recruitment or promotion. The recent 
enactment of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment at the Workplace Act which has yet to brought into 
force, contains some of these very same limitations.  
Thus what is once again a progressive law, can be use to reproduce governing sexual and gender 
norms, and continue to view the issue of equality through a protectionist approach. The impact of course is 
to at one level recognize that the problem of sexual harassment in the workplace does exist, but through 
reasoning that does not subvert or disrupt sexual or gender stereotypes.  
V - Conclusion 
 Indian sex discrimination case law has been informed by a formal approach to equality, within which 
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almost any differences can justify the differential treatment of women in law.  Sometimes this approach has the 
effect of upholding legislative provisions designed to benefit women.  But, often times, this approach has the 
effect of upholding legislative provisions that have disadvantaged women.  The formal approach to equality, 
coupled with a protectionist approach to gender difference, preempts any consideration of disadvantage: 
women are just different.  I have further examined the way in which familial ideology interacts with this 
dominant discourse of equality and undermines any consideration of substantive inequality.  Familial ideology 
constitutes women as wives and mothers reinforcing the construction of gender difference. The woman is 
different, and thus, is precluded from any entitlement to be treated the same.  Familial ideology thereby 
operates to immunize laws that treat women differently then men from constitutional challenge.   
 As I have argued, however, the impact of this familial ideology on women in the context of equality 
rights challenges is contradictory.  In many cases where men have sought to have legislation that is intended to 
promote women's interests struck down as discriminatory, familial ideology has operated to defeat the 
challenge.  The understanding of women as wives and mothers, as naturally different from men, lead the 
courts to conclude that women need not be treated the same as men, and that legislation that treats women 
differently is not unconstitutional.  Maintenance laws, for example, are thus upheld on the ground that women 
are different, and in need of protection.  Paradoxically, within a formal approach to equality, this 
understanding of women as different has had the effect of upholding laws that promote women's substantive 
equality. 
 In contrast to formal equality, there is a second substantive model of equality, in which the central 
question is whether the impugned legislation contributes to the subordination of the disadvantaged group, or 
to overcoming that subordination.  I suggest that substantive equality analysis might alter both the reasoning 
and results of the cases, by directing attention to the question of disadvantage. Such an approach to equality 
does not, in and of itself, answer the question of the relevance of gender difference.  Rather, this substantive 
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approach simply directs the interrogation to whether gender difference needs to be taken into account in 
furtherance of the substantive equality of women.  This approach opens space within which the difficult 
question of gender difference can be examined.  By directing attention to this question of disadvantage, this 
approach creates space for an analysis of the relationship between difference and disadvantage.  In this way, 
difference is not assumed to be natural, nor assumed to be relevant.  Rather, difference must itself become 
part of the analysis, rather than a justification for not pursuing an equality analysis.  Substantive equality 
redirects our attention to disadvantage, and to a critical interrogation of the dilemmas of difference; to the ways 
in which difference has been socially constructed, to the ways in which difference has very real material 
implications in individual's lives, and to the ways in which judicial approaches cannot simply proclaim on the 
relevance or irrelevance of difference, but rather, must begin to deconstruct the assumptions that are deeply 
embedded in the way we see the world. 
 The relationship between the discourses of equality and familialism will not be automatically resolved 
by a shift to a substantive model of equality.  Familial ideology can still operate to blind courts to the socially 
constructed nature of women's roles as wives and mothers in the family.  The substantive approach to equality 
simply opens the space within which this familial ideology, and the way in which these discourses constitute 
women as naturally different, can be further scrutinised and deconstructed.  By redirecting our attention to 
disadvantage instead of difference, this approach may facilitate an analysis of the ways in which women's 
position in the family has contributed to their social, economic and political inequality.  It does not in any way 
guarantee that the ideological grip of the family will be loosened.  But, it might take us a few steps further in 
the project of destabilising assumptions about gender difference.  A substantive approach to equality may 
provide feminists engaged with law with a way to make more complex legal arguments. 
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